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FinancingThis paper empirically investigates the antecedents of growth through mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in a
typical continental European country, Belgium. The article reports on a study using data on 484 private and
listed bidders engaging in 990 M&As during 1997–2007, and matches this sample with companies that did
not pursue any external growth. By analyzing firm characteristics, industry, and aggregate financial market
variables, the study can also discern the motives that are important in the decision to acquire. The results
show that neither the firm's cash position nor its cash-generating abilities influence its choice to grow
externally. Yet, intangible assets affect the M&A decision positively, whereas ownership concentration and
bank loans have a negative effect. In industries where incumbents are operating at a lower scale and in more
highly concentrated industries, the odds of firms participating in M&As are larger. Industry deregulation,
industry growth, and financial market conditions have no influence. These findings are largely comparable
across listed and private firms. Yet, the data do reveal that the operating scale of industry incumbents and
industry concentration matter only in horizontal and domestic takeover decisions.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are a popular means of growth for
firms. In 2007 alone, 35,982 deals were announced worldwide,
accounting for an aggregate deal value of USD 1,345 billion in the USA
and USD 3,053 billion in Europe. While several studies have used logit/
probit regression analysis to examine the company features that likely
make firms takeover targets (e.g., Dietrich and Sorensen, 1984; Palepu,
1986; Powell, 2001), only a few papers analyze the characteristics of
bidding companies. Furthermore, these articles have focused onM&As in
the Anglo-Saxonworld, typically during the fourth wave. Trahan (1993)
and Sorensen (2000), for example, use data from the USA, whereas Hayeert Dhaene, Stefan Duchateau,
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Luypaert M, Antecedents of
usres.2009.06.003and Liu (1998) considerM&As in theUK. These studies conclude that the
likelihoodof external growth is related to avariety offirmcharacteristics.
In particular, they document a positive relation with firm size, profit-
ability, and the market-to-book ratio, while leverage has a significant
negative effect.However, the latter authorsdonot thoroughly investigate
the influence of industry and aggregate financial market variables on
external growth decisions. Hence, firm size could spuriously capture the
impact of industry concentration, while the market-to-book ratio may
reflect the ease of bidding companies to compensate target investors
with stock when share prices are soaring. In contrast, this paper pays
careful attention to industry characteristics, such as the potential for
economies of scale, industry sales concentration, deregulation and
industry growth, and aggregate financial market variables, including
stock prices and interest rates, in the M&A decision.
Unlike earlier research, this article examines M&As in the fifth wave
in a typical continental European country, viz. Belgium. M&As in the
fourth wave, taking place particularly in the USA, were initiated for
different reasons than more recent transactions. Gaughan (2002), for
example, argues that M&As in the 1980s were the result of significant
inefficiencies in the way (conglomerate) corporations were run on the
one hand and the increased size of financial markets on the other hand.
Hence, M&As in the fourth wave have been characterized by hostility
and a heavy use of debt. In contrast,Weston and Jawien (1999) contend
that the most recent M&A wave, which started in the mid-1990s, was
largely engendered by global competition, technological change, and
deregulation. The integration process in Europe has further strength-
ened this wave, making the number and dollar value of M&As in Europegrowth through mergers and acquisitions: Empirical results from
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Bruner (2004), the development of the EU has simplified the transfer of
technology and intellectual capital, the realization of scale economies,
and deregulation. In sum, the above arguments stress the need to also
incorporate industry and financial market variables when analyzing the
antecedents of external growth in a continental European setting,
which this paper does.
The reason why this article explores Belgian data is that all
corporations in Belgium must file their annual financial statements
with the National Bank as of start-up, irrespective of their listing. This
rule provides unique access to the accounting data of more than
390,000 firms, covering more than 80% of Belgian GDP. Besides,
Belgium is one of the few countries in which ownership data are
publicly available for a large number of unlisted firms. While Belgium
offers a unique setting for an M&A study like this, the figures reported
by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and
Giannetti (2003) indicate that the institutional characteristics of
Belgium are largely comparable to those of other major countries in
continental Europe. In fact, Belgian law is representative for the family
of French civil-law systems. Also, as shown by Faccio and Masulis
(2005) and Martynova and Renneboog (2006), among others, the
characteristics of the M&As initiated by Belgian acquirers are similar
to those in other countries on the Continent.
Yet, corporate ownership and governance structures in continental
Europe, for example in Belgium, are very different from those in
Anglo-Saxon countries, which tends to further increase the value of a
European M&A study. First, the number of listed firms is much lower
in the average continental European country than in the USA. Market
capitalization as a percentage of GDP equals 133.6 percent in the USA,
whereas the average for EU-countries is only 86.1 percent. Hence,
while the literature to date has largely concentrated on listed
acquirers, a study on the antecedents of M&As in continental Europe
should also include data on private bidders, as done in this article.
Private enterprises may have difficulties in financing their growth,
especially M&As, as these deals cannot be implemented in subsequent
stages. Besides, when target shareholders are unwilling to accept the
stock of a private bidder, private acquirers may have no alternative
than to finance their M&As by means of internal sources and bank
loans. So, financial constraints could induce private firms to grow
organically or even forego growth.
These financial constraints may also apply to listed firms, as publicly
quoted firms in continental Europe have high ownership concentration
on average. La Porta et al. (1998) show that themedian ownership stake
of the three largest owners equals 62 percent in Belgium, compared to
only 12 percent in the USA. Controlling shareholders could thus be
reluctant to issue new stock to pay for their firm's M&As in order not to
dilute control. Conversely, when ownership is highly concentrated,
incentive problems between managers and investors should be less
severe on average. Managerial empire building and hubris should then
also be less important to explain external growth decisions in
continental Europe, ceteris paribus. To differentiate between ownership
concentration curbing M&As because of the desire to maintain control
vis-à-vis ownership concentration reducing managerial incentive
problems, this paper also examines whether the role of ownership
structure is different in industry-related versus unrelated M&As on the
one hand and in domestic versus cross-border M&As on the other hand.
Indeed, when managers pursue their own interests or when managers
suffer from hubris, they could favor M&As that allow for industry and
geographical diversification.
To examine the above research questions, this study uses data on 484
private and listed bidders that engaged in 990M&As during 1997–2007.
Themultivariate logit regression results show that, unlike earlier Anglo-
Saxon-based research, internal cash generation and cash reserves do not
affect the M&A decisions of Belgian firms. Also, the interaction terms of
these variables with ownership concentration are not significantly
related to the probability of external growth. Yet, the impact ofPlease cite this article as: Huyghebaert N, Luypaert M, Antecedents of
Belgium, J Bus Res (2009), doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.06.003ownership concentration is significantly negative, especially at higher
levels of ownership concentration. Likewise, firms relying more heavily
on bank loans are less inclined to participate in M&As. Overall, these
findings are inconsistent with Jensen's (1986) free cash flow theory, but
suggest that internal (i.e., the desire to maintain control) and external
(i.e., bank-driven) financial constraints restrict a firm's external growth.
Next, intangible assets are associated positively with the M&A
probability. Finally, the M&A decision relates to a number of industry
characteristics. In industries where incumbents are operating at a lower
scale and in highly concentrated industries, firms are more likely to
engage in M&As. Aggregate financial market conditions bear no relation
with external expansion. So, firms are not tempted into M&As solely
because of favorable capital market conditions, which is consistent with
the above-documented lack of managerial over-investment problems.
Interestingly, these findings are largely comparable across listed and
private firms. Yet, the data do reveal that the operating scale of industry
incumbents and industry sales concentration matter only in horizontal
and domestic takeover decisions.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the various hypotheses, while Section 3 describes the sample.
The results from the logit regression analyses as well as various
robustness checks are reported and discussed in Section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2. Hypotheses
Scholars have developed numerous arguments to explainwhy firms
may choose to participate in M&As (e.g., Gaughan, 2002; Trautwein,
1990;Weston et al., 2001). First, acquisitions often allowgrowing fast, as
the target is an organization already in place, with its own production
capacity, distribution network, and clientele. Besides, takeovers can be
cheaper than internal expansion, in particular when the replacement
costof target assets exceeds theirmarket value. Finally, and in contrast to
organic growth, M&As can be (partly) paid for with stock, which could
be interesting for firms with small cash reserves and/or limited debt
capacity. Building on the above arguments, the sections hereafter
develop testablepredictionsonhowbiddercharacteristics, industry, and
aggregate financial market variables could affect external growth
decisions. Table 1 summarizes the various explanatory variables and
their hypothesized relationwith theM&A probability. When applicable,
these variables are also related to the choice between a horizontal or
industry-diversifying transaction and the choice between a domestic or
cross-border M&Awhen pursuing external growth, thereby providing a
rationale for split-sample analyses based on these deal characteristics.
2.1. Managerial motives and governance
Jensen (1986) argues that managers may have incentives to expand
their firm beyond its optimal size. The reason is that growth generally
increasesmanagerial power and compensation. Besides, growth enables
managers to diversify their wealth, including human capital, and
improve job security when the target's cash flows are only imperfectly
correlated with those of their own firm. Such a reduction in the
combined firm's overall risk can be realized more easily by acquiring
targets in non-related industries as well as by engaging in cross-border
takeovers (e.g., Denis et al., 2002; Lloyd et al., 1987; Moeller and
Schlingemann, 2005; Norton, 1993). So, the expectation is that firms
subject to agencyproblemsof equity pursueM&As that allowgrowingat
a faster rate, and more specifically M&As diversifying across industries
and countries. In addition, Roll (1986) contends that hubris, that is the
excessive self-confidence of managers, is often another notable
managerial rationale underlying M&As. Malmendier and Tate (2008)
point out that those over-confident managers engage more in
diversifying M&As. They also document that these transactions in
particular are unlikely to create shareholder value.growth through mergers and acquisitions: Empirical results from
Table 1
The explanatory variables and their impact on the M&A probability.
Variable Definition Hypothesized
sign
Managerial motives and governance
- Easy access to internal financial resources
EBITDA/ASSETS The ratio of earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation and amortization to
total assets
+
CASH RATIO The ratio of cash and cash equivalents
to total assets
+




CASH RATIO ⁎ OWN CONC Interaction term between CASH RATIO
and OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION
−
- Monitoring and/or Financial constraints
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION The sum of squares of the percentage
stakes held by the firm's various
ultimate owners
−
BANK LOANS/ASSETS The ratio of bank loans to total assets −
Synergies
- Realization of operating synergies
INTANGIBLES/ASSETS The ratio of intangible assets minus
goodwill to total assets
+
INDUSTRY MES Median of the natural logarithm of
total assets of firms older than ten
years in the corresponding four-digit
SIC industry
+
- Realization of financial synergies
BANK LOANS/ASSETS The ratio of bank loans to total assets +
Market power
INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION Herfindahl-Hirschman index, that is
the sum of squares of themarket shares
of all firms in the corresponding four-
digit SIC industry
+




INDUSTRY DEREGULATION Dummy variable that equals one if the
industry has been deregulated, as of
deregulation, and zero otherwise
+
INDUSTRY GROWTH One-year lagged sales growth rate in




P/E The price/earnings ratio of the Belgian
stock market (using the Belgian All
Shares index)
+/−
YIELD SPREAD The difference between the average
yield on European corporate bonds
with rating BBB and the average yield
on Belgian government bonds, both
with a duration of five years
−
TERM SPREAD The difference between the average
yield on Belgian government bonds
with a duration of five years and the
yield on a Belgian Treasury Note with a
maturity of three months
−
Note. This table presents the definition of the various explanatory variables and the
hypothesized sign of their relation with the M&A probability.
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free cash flows initiate value-decreasing takeovers. Likewise, Morck,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) conclude thatmanagers in good-performing
firms are most likely to be infected by hubris. So, both the agency and
the hubris hypotheses predict a positive relation between a firm's access
to internal resources and its M&A probability. To proxy for internal cash
generation, this study uses the ratio of EBITDA to total assets.
Alternatively, the cash ratio is utilized to capture the effect of ready-
available cash reserves built up from retained earnings. An important
point regarding managerial motives underlying the positive relationPlease cite this article as: Huyghebaert N, Luypaert M, Antecedents of
Belgium, J Bus Res (2009), doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.06.003between internal resources and M&A decisions is that this relation
should be weaker for firmswith concentrated ownership. Indeed, when
a few large shareholders monitor the management closely, managerial
over-investment problems tend to occur less. So, if managerial self-
serving behavior and/or hubris are prevalent and concentrated own-
ership restrains wasteful investment decisions, the interaction term
between internal cash generation (cash ratio) and ownership concen-
tration should be significantly negative. To capture ownership concen-
tration, this article uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) concentration
index, which is defined as the sum of squared ownership stakes (e.g.,
Céspedes et al., in press).
Besides, ownership concentration by itself could capture the notion
that large owners care about preserving control and thus avoid issuing
new stock. As the opportunities to financeM&As are now restricted, the
odds of external growth could be adversely affected too, resulting in a
negative coefficient on ownership concentration. Arguably, although
the likelihood of managerial self-serving behavior underlying M&A
decisions is smaller when shares are closely held, a negative coefficient
on ownership concentration by itself does not allow concluding that
agency problems and/or hubris are prevalent. The coefficients on the
above cash (flow) variables and especially their interactions with
ownership concentration should be more informative for this purpose.
Next, Jensen claims that debt-service obligations reduce the free cash
flows available for spending at managerial discretion. Simultaneously,
firms that have fully used their debt capacity face more severe financial
constraints. As the firms in this study typically raise debt from banks
rather than in the public bond market, this paper conjectures a negative
coefficient on the fraction of assets that is financed by means of bank
loans in the external growth equation. Also, when bank monitoring
helps to prevent value-destroying M&As, this variable should matter
especially in takeovers diversifying across industries and countries.
2.2. Synergies
Synergy benefits refer to the ability of a corporate combination to be
more profitable than the individual units that are combining. This paper
examines the role of operating as well as financial synergies. First,
owningunique technologyandknowledgemaycreate anopportunity to
realize M&A synergies from transferring these intangibles to the target
firm (Lehto and Lehtoranta, 2004). The industrial organization (IO)
literature claims that R&D effects may arise in both horizontal and
industry-diversifying acquisitions. When firms are active in the same
lineof business,M&As can lead to economiesof scale inR&D input; if not,
M&As can also create value from uniting complementary know-how
(e.g., Cassiman et al., 2003). Likewise, intangibles could matter in
domestic as well cross-border takeovers (e.g., Kang and Johansson,
2000). The ratio of intangible assets (minus goodwill paid in earlier
M&As) to total assets is used to examine these ideas.
Next, the study investigates the potential for more general
economies of scale in an industry. The underlying rationale is that
prior to their M&A, firms are operating at levels of activity that fall
short of achieving low per-unit costs. Following the IO literature, the
industry minimum efficient scale (MES) is proxied by the median
natural log of total assets in the corresponding four-digit SIC industry.
Like Huyghebaert and Van de Gucht (2004), only industry incumbents
older than ten years are considered to calculate the industry MES, as
business start-ups typically enter the industry at a small size. When
firms use M&As to realize scale economies in a faster manner, the
relation between the industry MES and external growth should be
positive. What's more, economies of scale are expected to be
important especially in horizontal M&As. Indeed, the likelihood that
bidder and target assets can be integrated physically after a deal tends
to be higher in such takeovers (see Devos et al., 2009). For the same
reason, scale economies possibly matter only in domestic M&As.
Finally, this article examines the motive to realize financial
synergies by looking at the capital structure of potential acquirers.growth through mergers and acquisitions: Empirical results from
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quickly their overall risk and realize a lower cost of capital by engaging
especially in industry-diversifying and in cross-border M&As. Indeed,
when the cash flows from target and bidder are not highly correlated,
such transactions could reduce the cost of capital and even create
additional borrowing capacity post-M&A.
2.3. Market power
In highly concentrated industries,firms tend to recognize the impact
of their policies and actions on one another. This behavior could
influence firm reactions to changes in competitive decisions, like
quantity restrictions, and result in tacit collusion. Horizontal M&As to
increase the concentrationwithin an industry may help firms to realize
such market power. For instance, Kim and Singal (1993) and Krishnan
and Krishnan (2003) report enlarged pricing power following M&As in
the airline and hospital industry, respectively. Conversely, when the
industry is already highly concentrated, the incidence of M&As could be
lower, as less room for further consolidation remains. Also, antitrust
authorities may closely scrutinize newly planned deals in concentrated
industries. To capture industry concentration, this article uses the
Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) concentration index, capturing the sum of
squared market shares. Based upon the above arguments, a quadratic
term in industry concentration is also included to seize a possible non-
linear effect.
2.4. Industry shocks
Deregulation could be an important determinant of M&A activity
across industries, as deregulation removes artificial constraints on the
size of incumbents and incites new firms to enter. Hence, to adapt to the
changes engendered by deregulation, industries need to restructure,
which canbe facilitated byM&As (Mitchell andMulherin,1996;Harford,
2005). To test the effects of deregulation, this study creates a dummy
that equals one as of the year of industry deregulation and zero
otherwise. During the period of the analyses, European policy makers
have made special efforts in the further deregulation of network
industries.
Besides, major changes in the demand and supply conditions in an
industry can cause a shift in the number and size of firms operating in
that industry. Various researchers have pointed out a link between
abnormally low or exceptionally high industry growth rates and
takeover activity. On the one hand, industry growth could be
negatively related to the M&A probability when especially firms in
low-growth industries participate in M&As (e.g., Powell and Yawson,
2005). The reason is that firms in mature or declining industries may
want to shift their resources into growing industries or into new
markets abroad, to guarantee their long-run survival. Alternatively,
firms in low-growth industries may be obliged to consolidate in their
own industry. Yet, under this bankruptcy-avoidance hypothesis, firms
with poor growth prospects should engage mostly in horizontal
M&As. On the other hand, Andrade and Stafford (2004) argue that
particularly firms in high-growth industries become acquirers,
provided they can collect the funds needed to buy peers. This relation
arises when firms try to benefit as much as possible from the high
growth in their industry via (fast) M&As. When industry growth
influences the M&A decision positively, deals should be horizontal in
nature, all else constant. When, because of globalization, favorable
industry conditions are not limited to a single country, this relation
may also extend to cross-border M&As.
In sum, the data have to reveal the true relation between industry
growth and the likelihood and nature of M&As. This article uses the
one-year lagged sales growth rate in the corresponding industry to
investigate its influence. By incorporating the lagged real GDP growth
rate as a control variable, the effect of industry growth can be isolated
better from that of the economy as a whole.Please cite this article as: Huyghebaert N, Luypaert M, Antecedents of
Belgium, J Bus Res (2009), doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.06.0032.5. Exploiting financial market conditions
If stock prices are depressed, the takeover of a listed firm can
constitute a bargain relative to investing in new facilities from scratch.
Moreover, once stockmarket sentiment is down, the valuationof private
targets likely is lower too, through the use of a higher risk premium or
through the use of lower multiples when valuing target stock. This
under-valuation hypothesis thus suggests that stock prices and M&A
decisions are negatively related. In contrast, soaring stock prices can
facilitate the financing of M&As by using bidder stock to pay for these
deals. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) indeed argue that firms tend to issue
new shares when they consider their stock to be over-valued. The latter
argument suggests a positive relation between stock prices and external
growth. Yet, when a sample is dominated by private enterprises, as in
this study, such a positive relation may be difficult to observe, also
because target investors may be unwilling to accept non-listed bidder
stock. In addition, bidder owners may be reluctant to issue new shares
when they care about preserving control. This study uses the average
market-wide price-earnings (P/E) ratio at theM&Aannouncement date
to capture stock market conditions, given that private firms dominate
the sample.
Finally, the study controls for the yield spread between corporate
and government bonds and the term spread between long-term and
short-term interest rates, as these spreads could affect financing
decisions and hence also investment decisions. A higher yield spread
(term spread) increases the cost of borrowing, thereby negatively
affecting firm investment rates. So, this paper expects a negative
coefficient on the yield spread (term spread), independent of the
deal's industry and geographical focus. The yield spread is measured
as the difference between the average yield on European corporate
bondswith BBB-rating and five-year duration and the average yield on
Belgian government bonds with the same duration. The term spread is
calculated as the difference between the yield on five-year Belgian
government bonds and the yield on three-month Belgian Treasury
Notes.
3. Sample
The M&As in this study were collected from the Zephyr database,
which contains detailed information on more than 500,000 M&As
worldwide, with pan-European deals dating back to 1997. Nominimum
deal value is required in order for deals to be included in Zephyr. Also,
M&As involving public aswell as private bidders are covered. Compared
to the SDC Platinum database of Thomson Financial andMergerstat, the
Zephyr database covers deals of smaller value and has a better coverage
of European transactions. Interestingly, the information in Zephyr can be
easily combined with the financial statements in Belfirst, as both are
commercialized by Bureau Van Dijk. Belfirst also provides information
on the activities of firms, by means of their four-digit SIC codes.
The study first considered all announced M&As covered by Zephyr,
irrespective of their completion. The rationale for its focus on
announced deals is that this study is interested in the motives
underlying M&As, regardless of the outcome of a planned deal. Using
Zephyr, the study identified a sample of 548 Belgian bidders that are
covered by Belfirst, that report information on their activities in Belfirst,
and that announced at least one M&A during 1997–2007. As the annual
accounts of banks, real estate investment trusts, insurance companies,
and holdings are compiled in another manner, firms with a main SIC
code starting with ‘6’were excluded. As a result, the sample contains no
private-equity deals either. Overall, these 548 firms engaged in 1,105
M&As during the sample period. Fig. 1 reveals that M&A activity in
Belgium follows the same pattern as that in continental Europe, while
Fig. 2 shows that average deal size is also comparable.
Some of the announced M&As are deals where the bidder already
owned a controlling stake in the target and thus simply announced to
increase this block. As the latter deals do not (uniquely) reflect a firm'sgrowth through mergers and acquisitions: Empirical results from
Fig. 1.M&A activity in Belgium and in continental Europe. Source: The Zephyr database.
Table 2
Deal characteristics.
Full sample Public bidders Private bidders
N % N % N %
Completed 795 80.30 305 81.77 490 79.42
Announced 187 18.89 64 17.16 123 19.94
Withdrawn 8 0.81 4 1.07 4 0.65
Mergers 37 3.74 0 0.00 37 6.00
Acquisitions 953 96.26 373 100.00 580 94.00
Hostile 9 0.91 5 1.34 4 0.65
Friendly 981 99.09 368 98.66 613 99.35
Industry-related 475 47.98 143 38.34 332 53.81
Industry-diversifying 515 52.02 230 61.66 285 46.19
Domestic 504 50.91 117 31.37 387 62.72
Cross-border 486 49.09 256 68.63 230 37.28
Cash payment 98 73.68 58 65.91 40 88.89
Stock payment 35 26.32 30 34.09 5 11.11
Note. This table reports summary statistics on M&A characteristics. The table provides
an overview of the number of completed, announced, andwithdrawn deals, the number
of mergers and acquisitions, the number of hostile and friendly deals, the number of
industry-related and industry-diversifying deals (using bidder four-digit SIC codes), the
number of domestic and cross-border deals, and the number of deals that were paid
entirely in cash and in stock, respectively. The information on the method of payment is
based on only 134 deals, due to limited data availability for this item. These numbers are
reported for the full sample as well as for the subgroups of public (i.e. listed) and private
(i.e. unlisted) bidders.
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owned 50 percent of target stock before theM&A announcement were
removed (98 deals). Finally, the M&As that were initiated shortly after
the bidder's IPO were also deleted (17 deals). The reason is that
several firm characteristics, such as firm size, leverage, asset structure,
etc., are affected by the IPO, which tends to introduce noise in the
variable measurements. These selection criteria resulted in a final
sample of 484 bidders that engaged in 990 M&As during 1997–2007.
Not surprisingly, 38% of acquirers are publicly quoted, whereas only 3%
of targets are listed.
Table 2 provides an overview of various deal characteristics.
Approximately 80% of sample transactions were completed by
December 2008, the moment of data collection. The sample is largely
dominated by takeovers (96%). Deals are almost exclusively friendly in
nature, which notes a marked difference with the US market,
particularly during the fourth wave. Based upon four-digit SIC codes,
48% of transactions are classified as industry-related (horizontal).
Besides, 49% of sample deals are cross-border, which exceeds
considerably the number reported in studies using US data (e.g.,
Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). The high incidence of cash
payments (74%), contrasting again with US evidence, is consistent
with the idea that bidder owners care about preserving control.
Table 2 also reports deal characteristics for public versus private
bidders, revealing that listed acquirers participate more often in
industry-diversifying and in cross-border M&As. Besides, cash is used
more frequently when the acquirer is privately held.
Overall, 332 bidders engaged in oneM&A, 74 in twoM&As, and 78 in
three or more takeovers in a particular year. If an acquirer initiated
multiple M&As in the same year, the firm was included in the analyses
only once for that year, thereby reducing the final sample size to 733Fig. 2. Average deal size in Belgium and in continental Europe. Source: The Zephyr
database.
Please cite this article as: Huyghebaert N, Luypaert M, Antecedents of
Belgium, J Bus Res (2009), doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.06.003observations. For each event firm, a non-acquiring company was
selected from Belfirst, resulting in a total sample of 1,466 observations.
This matching firm was identified as the company with the same
public/private status, of similar size (total assets), and not involved in
M&As during a two-year historical period. The explanatory variables for
both the acquiring and matching firms are measured one year before
the transaction. For the firms that belong to a corporate group (35%),
the firm-level characteristics are calculated based on the consolidated
financial statements, whenever available. This approach accounts for
asset shifting and the creation of internal capital markets between the
members of an industrial group (George and Kabir, 2008). When the
acquiring or matching firm is a group member but does not consolidate
itself, the consolidated accounts of the ultimate owner were collected.
Belfirst was also the main source for firm ownership information and
the industry-level data. To capture a shareholder's ultimate ownership,
this study considers its direct as well as indirect ownership. Stock
market data were collected from Datastream and Belgostat, whereas
the real GDP growth rate was downloaded from Eurostat. The latter
databases contain an extensive number of macro-economic and
development statistics for Belgium and EU-members, respectively.
Finally, bond yields were retrieved from Bloomberg. To limit the
influence of outliers, all variables – except for dummy variables – were
winsorized at 5–95 percent.
Table 3 contains summary statistics on the various explanatory
variables. For the firm-level and industry characteristics, the table also
reports the p-values of a parametric t-test and a non-parametric
Wilcoxon rank-sum test to decide whether these variables are
significantly different across acquiring and matching firms. Table 3,
Panel A shows that the average ratio of EBITDA to total assets equals
10.2% for event firms and 9.5% for matching firms, which is significantly
different only under a Wilcoxon test. Likewise, the cash ratio is
somewhat larger for M&A bidders (9.9%) than for non-acquiring firms
(9.4%). Average ownership concentration equals 47.5% in the sample of
acquirers, which is significantly below the 74.5% of matching firms. In
bidding (matching) firms, the largest owner on average holds a stake of
58.3% (77.3%). The ratio of bank loans to assets is comparable acrossgrowth through mergers and acquisitions: Empirical results from
Table 3
Summary statistics.
Panel A: Bidding versus matching firms
Bidding firms Matching firms t-test Wilcoxon test
Firm characteristics Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. p-value p-value
EBITDA/ASSETS 0.1021 0.0921 0.0937 0.0949 0.0789 0.0908 0.1320 0.0941
CASH RATIO 0.0991 0.0510 0.1200 0.0942 0.0363 0.1288 0.4419 0.0036
OWNERSHIP CONC 0.4747 0.3557 0.3908 0.7452 1.0000 0.3742 0.0000 0.0000
LARGEST OWNER 0.5825 0.5208 0.3380 0.7726 1.0000 0.3216 0.0000 0.0000
BANK LOANS/ASSETS 0.2331 0.1874 0.2753 0.2419 0.1774 0.2498 0.5279 0.5819
INTANGIBLES/ASSETS 0.0136 0.0009 0.0254 0.0076 0.0000 0.0206 0.0000 0.0000
FIRM SIZE 10.4472 10.4654 2.2923 10.3882 10.4088 2.2378 0.6462 0.6322
Industry variables
INDUSTRY MES 6.3798 6.1025 1.1266 6.5151 6.2710 1.1154 0.0181 0.0030
IND CONCENTRATION 0.1418 0.0814 0.1527 0.1299 0.0707 0.1410 0.1226 0.1801
IND DEREGULATION 0.0191 0.0000 0.1370 0.0181 0.0000 0.1335 0.8916 0.9746
INDUSTRY GROWTH 0.0765 0.0484 0.1720 0.0840 0.0633 0.1724 0.4258 0.1272
Financial market variables
GDP GROWTH 0.0211 0.0168 0.0108
P/E 13.8737 14.0000 3.2239
YIELD SPREAD 0.0102 0.0086 0.0048
TERM SPREAD 0.0101 0.0101 0.0054
Panel B: Horizontal versus industry-diversifying takeovers
Horizontal takeovers Industry-diversifying takeovers t-test Wilcoxon test
Firm characteristics Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. p-value p-value
EBITDA/ASSETS 0.1034 0.0904 0.0942 0.1015 0.0934 0.0936 0.7934 0.8266
CASH RATIO 0.0990 0.0510 0.1166 0.0993 0.0507 0.1221 0.9764 0.6967
OWNERSHIP CONC 0.5225 0.4159 0.3893 0.4517 0.3181 0.3897 0.0509 0.0660
LARGEST OWNER 0.6266 0.5855 0.3321 0.5615 0.5016 0.3387 0.0377 0.0450
BANK LOANS/ASSETS 0.2394 0.1932 0.3602 0.2299 0.1864 0.2159 0.6541 0.6208
INTANGIBLES/ASSETS 0.0114 0.0004 0.0236 0.0148 0.0012 0.0264 0.0851 0.0417
FIRM SIZE 9.9053 9.6861 2.1036 10.7365 10.8671 2.3372 0.0000 0.0000
Panel C: Domestic versus cross-border takeovers
Domestic takeovers Cross-border takeovers t-test Wilcoxon test
Firm characteristics Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. p-value p-value
EBITDA/ASSETS 0.1017 0.0882 0.0997 0.1027 0.0955 0.0869 0.8917 0.5335
CASH RATIO 0.1012 0.0510 0.1195 0.0970 0.0507 0.1209 0.6395 0.2743
OWNERSHIP CONC 0.5186 0.4038 0.3932 0.4356 0.2773 0.3846 0.0155 0.0484
LARGEST OWNER 0.6209 0.6017 0.3377 0.5486 0.5000 0.3343 0.0146 0.0359
BANK LOANS/ASSETS 0.2328 0.1628 0.3263 0.2337 0.1997 0.2063 0.9628 0.1994
INTANGIBLES/ASSETS 0.0140 0.0011 0.0263 0.0132 0.0009 0.0245 0.6907 0.7202
FIRM SIZE 9.9973 9.6348 2.2785 10.9302 11.0985 2.2062 0.0000 0.0000
Panel D: Public versus private bidders
Public bidders Private bidders t-test Wilcoxon test
Firm characteristics Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. p-value p-value
EBITDA/ASSETS 0.1145 0.1073 0.0898 0.0987 0.0846 0.0946 0.0580 0.0316
CASH RATIO 0.0889 0.0408 0.1224 0.1021 0.0534 0.1194 0.2181 0.0013
OWNERSHIP CONC 0.2292 0.1788 0.1932 0.5749 0.5627 0.4060 0.0000 0.0000
LARGEST OWNER 0.3927 0.3760 0.2160 0.6603 0.7307 0.3474 0.0000 0.0000
BANK LOANS/ASSETS 0.1833 0.1579 0.1518 0.2474 0.1990 0.3000 0.0089 0.0438
INTANGIBLES/ASSETS 0.0210 0.0052 0.0307 0.0115 0.0007 0.0233 0.0000 0.0018
FIRM SIZE 12.4754 12.5180 1.5957 9.8661 9.6856 2.1242 0.0000 0.0000
Note. Panel A in this table reports the mean, median, and standard deviation of the various firm characteristics, industry, and aggregate financial market variables for bidding firms
and their matching counterparts. For each firm and industry characteristic, the table also reports the p-value of a parametric t-test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test that
compare firms engaging in M&As in a particular year with firms that did not. Panels B, C and D report results for acquirers only, after splitting the event sample based upon whether
the M&A is horizontal or industry-diversifying, whether the M&A is domestic or cross-border, whether the bidder is a public or private firm, respectively. p-values that are significant
at the 10% level are highlighted in bold.
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intangible assets. Unsurprisingly, M&A bidders andmatching firms have
a similar size.
Regarding industry variables, Panel A reveals that the average size
of incumbent firms (6.4) is much smaller than that of acquirers (10.4).
Together, these results point out in a univariate manner that M&A
bidders are the largest firms in their industries. Next, the average
bidder industry has a HH concentration index of 14.2% and grows by
7.7% per annum; these numbers are comparable to those of the
matching-firm industries. Real GDP on average grows by 2.1% per year.
The average P/E ratio for the Belgian stock market is 13.9 per annumPlease cite this article as: Huyghebaert N, Luypaert M, Antecedents of
Belgium, J Bus Res (2009), doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.06.003during 1997–2007, with a standard deviation of 3.2. The average yield
spread (term spread) equals 1.02% (1.01%).
Panels B–C report separate summary statistics on the characteristics
of firms engaging in horizontal versus industry-diversifying M&As, and
in domestic versus cross-border M&As. Differences are limited,
concerning particularly the firm's ownership structure and size. In
contrast, Panel D shows that the disparities between public and private
bidders are muchmore pronounced. In particular, public bidders have a
larger ratio of EBITDA to assets, a lower cash ratio, a smaller ownership
concentration, a lower ratio of bank loans to assets, a higher fraction of
intangible assets, and a larger firm size.growth through mergers and acquisitions: Empirical results from
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In the regression models hereafter, the dependent variable is a
binomial choice variable that equals one if a firm grows through M&A
in a particular year and zero otherwise. An analysis of the correlations
among the explanatory variables only revealed a too high correlation
between the P/E ratio and the yield spread (ρ=- 0.79). So, the base
regression models just include the P/E ratio; this variable is then
replaced with the yield spread in additional tests (see further). Finally,
all models account for a potential correlation of error terms across
observations because of M&A clustering by applying the Huber-White
correction to standard errors.
The logit regression models hereafter first consider the entire
sample of acquiring and matching firms. Next, the sample was split to
examine the drivers of external growth in various subsamples.4.1. M&A decisions in the entire sample
The logit regression output for the entire sample is presented in
Table 4. Panel A reports the results with EBITDA/total assets, whereas
Panel B uses the cash ratio. In column 1 of each panel, the models
include simple terms in EBITDA/total assets and the cash ratio, while
these variables are interacted with (1–ownership concentration) in
column 2. A first simple interaction with ownership concentration
revealed too high correlations with EBITDA/total assets and the cash
ratio. To solve this econometric problem, interaction variables with
(1–ownership concentration) were computed and EBITDA/total
assets (cash ratio) was removed from Panel A (B). This alternative
specification allows testing the managerial-motives hypothesis in an
equally valid manner; under this hypothesis positive parameter
estimates on the interaction terms are expected. Building on the
results of Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), column 3 of each panel is
estimated with a simple and a quadratic term in ownership
concentration, whereas dummies corresponding to various ownership
intervals are used in column 4. In column 5, the stake of the largest
owner is utilized. Finally, as ownership concentration is not known for
all firms, the models in column 6 exclude this variable.
Table 4 shows that internal cash generation, proxied by EBITDA/
total assets in Panel A, and available cash reserves, measured by the
cash ratio in Panel B, do not affect the M&A decision. When free cash
flows are calculated more directly following the study of Lehn and
Poulsen (1989), this new variable remains unrelated to the M&A
probability (not reported). So, firms are not tempted into M&As solely
because of easy access to internal funds. These findings contrast with
what has been documented earlier for Anglo-Saxon M&As (e.g., Hay
and Liu, 1998; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Sorensen, 2000; Trahan,
1993). Next, the coefficients on the interaction terms of EBITDA/total
assets and the cash ratio with (1–ownership concentration) are not
significant either. In sum, these results allow concluding that
managerial motives are not a major force driving the M&A decisions
of Belgian firms.
Yet, the results in columns 1–2 do reveal that firms with
concentrated ownership are less inclined to participate in M&As, ceteris
paribus. The regression output in columns 3–4 actually suggests that the
negative impact of this variable is driven by the firms with the highest
ownership concentration. Although a negative coefficient could indicate
that large investors temper managerial over-investment problems by
their monitoring, together the findings in this and the previous
paragraph rather suggest that block holders care about preserving
control. Indeed, the results for the cash (flow) variables provide no
support at all for Jensen's free cash flow theory. In contrast, firms with
large owners may be hampered to pursue M&As once these owners
disapprove the idea of issuing new stock to compensate target investors.
Finally, column 5 shows that the negative influence of ownership
concentration endures when considering the stake of the firm's largestPlease cite this article as: Huyghebaert N, Luypaert M, Antecedents of
Belgium, J Bus Res (2009), doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.06.003investor. Then, the simple term in ownership concentration becomes
significantly positive.
The ratio of bank loans to total assets has a significant negative
impact on external growth, in both panels. Yet, its effect becomes
insignificant in column 6. While a negative sign is consistent with the
bankmonitoring and disciplining idea, the paper already revealed that
managerial over-investment is not a main motive behind Belgian
M&As. So, a negative coefficient on the bank loans variable most likely
indicates that the obligation to make interest payments and repay the
loan principal restricts the possibility to financeM&As. The notion that
financial constraints are binding in a sample that is dominated by
private enterprises is not surprising at all.
Interestingly, the ratio of intangible to total assets is significantly
positively related to the probability of external expansion, thereby
supporting the conjecture that operating synergies from transferring
technology and intellectual capital to another firm are an important
rationale underlying M&As. This conclusion is also compatible with
the findings of Lehto and Lehtoranta (2004), showing that a firm's
R&D stock contributes positively to its likelihood of becoming an
acquirer.
Remarkably, the variable measuring the industry minimum efficient
scale is significantly negatively associated with external growth,
thereby pointing out that scale economies are not a major rationale
behind the M&A decisions of Belgian firms. The latter relation also
emerges when using other metrics (number of employees or sales) to
calculate the industry MES. Arguably, these results can be justified by
the relatively large size of acquirers, as shown in Table 3. Replacing the
industryMESwith a dummy that equals onewhen firm size exceeds the
industry MES and zero otherwise or by a continuous variable relating
firm size to the operating scale of incumbents reveals that both
variables are not related to external growth. Finally, when the industry
MES is interactedwith a dummy capturingwhether or not the firm files
consolidated statements, to account for some firms having subsidiaries
with separate legal identities, the above conclusions are not affected.
As the quadratic term in industry concentrationwas not significant
in the first model of each panel, the variable was deleted from all
subsequent models. Overall, the results in columns 2–6 indicate that
the odds of external growth increase with industry concentration. A
positive coefficient is in line with the market power hypothesis, but
should be examined further in horizontal transactions (see
Section 4.2).
Unlike Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Harford (2005), the
results in this article do not support the notion that M&As occur more
often in industries that experienced a recent deregulation. This
conclusion is robust when setting the dummy equal to one as of one
(two) year(s) before deregulation, to account for a potential
anticipation of changes in industry regulation. Next, the relation
between industry growth and M&A decisions is never significant,
which contrasts with previous findings by Andrade and Stafford
(2004) and Powell and Yawson (2005). GDP growth is not significant
either, even not when this variable is measured in nominal rather than
in real terms.
The under- or over-valuation hypotheses are not supported in
Table 4, as the P/E ratio is never significant. This same conclusion
ariseswhen the P/E ratio is replacedwith the one-year (or three-year)
total return on the Belgian All Shares index or the Dow Jones Euro
Stoxx index (not reported). Given the high average ownership
concentration in the sample, these findings may not be too surprising
as – consistent with the above results – owners may be reluctant to
issue new shares to preserve control. Likewise, given the high
incidence of cash payments, stock prices should be less important in
explaining M&A decisions anyway. When the P/E ratio is replaced
with the yield spread, the latter variable also bears no relation with
the M&A probability. Finally, the term spread is never significant in
Table 4. These findings are robust when using bonds with other
durations to measure the yield and term spread (not reported). Ingrowth through mergers and acquisitions: Empirical results from
Table 4
Logit regression results on the M&A decisions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL A: Results with EBITDA/ASSETS
C 1.3777 1.3881 0.9980 0.9596 1.1965 0.8388
(0.0085) (0.0081) (0.0610) (0.0650) (0.0321) (0.0479)
EBITDA/ASSETS 0.9357 0.8209 0.6769 0.8559 0.7852
(0.1816) (0.2430) (0.3371) (0.2291) (0.1787)
EBITDA/ASSETS ⁎ (1–OWN CONC) 0.9385
(0.4698)
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION - 1.6109 - 1.5271 1.1877
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1597)




LARGEST SHAREHOLDER2 - 2.9005
(0.0003)
DUMMY=1 if 0.25bOWNb0. 50 0.1600
(0.4169)
DUMMY=1 if 0.50bOWNb0. 75 - 0.7728
(0.0063)
DUMMY=1 if 0.75bOWNb1.00 - 1.3308
(0.0000)
BANK LOANS/ASSETS - 0.4928 - 0.4877 - 0.5103 - 0.4666 - 0.4835 - 0.2612
(0.0724) (0.0751) (0.0659) (0.0892) (0.0866) (0.2538)
INTANGIBLES/ASSETS 11.4319 11.3449 10.7250 10.7208 11.9779 11.9899
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000)
INDUSTRY MES - 0.1351 - 0.1397 - 0.1310 - 0.1242 - 0.1608 - 0.1754
(0.0397) (0.0312) (0.0435) (0.0539) (0.0152) (0.0011)
INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION 0.6687 1.0094 0.8654 0.8958 1.0295 1.1325
(0.6574) (0.0344) (0.0717) (0.0587) (0.0376) (0.0059)
INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION2 0.6880
(0.8070)
INDUSTRY DEREGULATION - 0.5613 - 0.5595 - 0.6067 - 0.6372 - 0.5536 - 0.1240
(0.3110) (0.3097) (0.2784) (0.2432) (0.3368) (0.7603)
INDUSTRY GROWTH - 0.0515 - 0.0454 - 0.0579 - 0.0629 - 0.0890 - 0.3187
(0.8910) (0.9035) (0.8783) (0.8656) (0.8172) (0.3267)
GDP GROWTH 4.0671 3.9309 5.1161 4.6707 - 0.7129 0.1862
(0.5002) (0.5144) (0.3990) (0.4409) (0.9085) (0.9715)
P/E - 0.0109 - 0.0105 - 0.0114 - 0.0064 - 0.0019 0.0046
(0.5752) (0.5898) (0.5529) (0.7405) (0.9196) (0.7792)
TERM SPREAD 2.6153 2.6835 3.2909 2.3060 - 16.9689 - 3.4751
(0.8324) (0.8283) (0.7905) (0.8526) (0.1834) (0.7426)
Number of observations 1,207 1,207 1,207 1,207 1,207 1,446
McFadden R-square 0.0989 0.0981 0.1056 0.1029 0.0874 0.0218
PANEL B: Results with CASH RATIO
C 1.6470 1.5659 1.2563 1.2161 1.4124 0.9474
(0.0018) (0.0034) (0.0187) (0.0200) (0.0118) (0.0280)
CASH RATIO - 0.7641 - 0.7429 - 0.8017 - 0.6143 - 0.1179
(0.1432) (0.1547) (0.1232) (0.2518) (0.7904)
CASH RATIO ⁎ (1–OWN CONC) - 0.5328
(0.5868)
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION - 1.6316 - 1.6802 1.1375
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1770)




LARGEST SHAREHOLDER2 - 2.9284
(0.0003)
DUMMY=1 if 0.25bOWNb0. 50 0.1385
(0.4810)
DUMMY=1 if 0.50bOWNb0. 75 - 0.7897
(0.0049)
DUMMY=1 if 0.75bOWNb1.00 - 1.3547
(0.0000)
BANK LOANS/ASSETS - 0.5638 - 0.5000 - 0.5803 - 0.5465 - 0.5360 - 0.2715
(0.0447) (0.0713) (0.0416) (0.0514) (0.0643) (0.2391)
INTANGIBLES/ASSETS 11.6480 11.5293 10.9808 10.9904 12.1730 12.0695
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
INDUSTRY MES - 0.1496 - 0.1433 - 0.1432 - 0.1368 - 0.1699 - 0.1801
(0.0229) (0.0271) (0.0275) (0.0341) (0.0105) (0.0009)
INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION 0.9587 1.0277 0.9122 0.9414 1.0661 1.1620
(0.5239) (0.0309) (0.0565) (0.0463) (0.0308) (0.0046)
INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION2 0.1964
(0.9444)
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Table 4 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PANEL B: Results with CASH RATIO
INDUSTRY DEREGULATION - 0.5365 - 0.5439 - 0.5829 - 0.6169 - 0.5410 - 0.1171
(0.3381) (0.3300) (0.3014) (0.2626) (0.3518) (0.7762)
INDUSTRY GROWTH - 0.0796 - 0.0530 - 0.0850 - 0.0954 - 0.1146 - 0.3174
(0.8330) (0.8877) (0.8228) (0.7979) (0.7675) (0.3285)
GDP GROWTH 4.0771 4.1399 5.0897 4.7179 - 0.8690 0.2304
(0.4985) (0.4912) (0.4005) (0.4360) (0.8885) (0.9646)
P/E - 0.0118 - 0.0115 - 0.0123 - 0.0075 - 0.0024 0.0051
(0.5438) (0.5533) (0.5231) (0.7003) (0.8990) (0.7544)
TERM SPREAD 3.2819 3.2730 3.8063 2.7781 - 16.2489 - 3.3214
(0.7904) (0.7912) (0.7581) (0.8223) (0.2021) (0.7528)
Number of observations 1,211 1,211 1,211 1,211 1,211 1,450
McFadden R-square 0.0998 0.0987 0.1064 0.1041 0.0879 0.0210
Note. The dependent variable in this table equals one if the company grew throughM&A in a particular year and zero otherwise. A company and its matching firm are included in the
analyses only for the year of M&A. A definition of the explanatory variables and the hypothesized sign of their relation with the M&A probability are presented in Table 1. All
explanatory variables aremeasured in the year before the transaction. Panel A presents the results with EBITDA/ASSETS, whereas panel B reports the results with CASH RATIO. The p-
values are reported in parentheses. Variables that are significant at the 10% level are highlighted in bold.
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explaining the M&A decisions of Belgian firms.
4.2. M&A decisions in different subsamples
In this section, the results of various split-sample regression models
are discussed. Table 5 reports the results for horizontal versus industry-
diversifying takeovers, while Table 6 distinguishes between domestic
and cross-border deals. If the bidder initiatedmultipleM&As in the same
year, the classification alternatively considered whether at least one of
the targets was from the same industry/country (reported) or whetherTable 5
Logit regression results on horizontal versus industry-diversifying M&A decisions.
Horizontal takeovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
C 0.9236 1.0420 1.1604 1.5771 1.7062
(0.3681) (0.3110) (0.2608) (0.1140) (0.088
EBITDA/ASSETS 2.8253 2.8294
(0.0273) (0.0286)
EBITDA/ASSETS ⁎ (1–OWN CONC) 2.0382
(0.4029)
CASH RATIO - 1.0917 - 1.201
(0.2342) (0.191
CASH RATIO ⁎ (1–OWN CONC)
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 2.4970 2.3997 2.6361 2.3522 2.2675
(0.1032) (0.1173) (0.0867) (0.1179) (0.131
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION2 - 3.7053 - 3.6281 - 3.6956 - 3.6593 - 3.59
(0.0060) (0.0071) (0.0054) (0.0060) (0.006
BANK LOANS/ASSETS - 0.0624 - 0.0920 - 0.1058 - 0.1633 - 0.20
(0.8973) (0.8518) (0.8290) (0.7366) (0.682
INTANGIBLES/ASSETS 9.7010 9.2343 8.8112 9.3218 8.8335
(0.0648) (0.0815) (0.0971) (0.0780) (0.097
INDUSTRY MES - 0.2011 - 0.2432 - 0.2530 - 0.2477 - 0.29
(0.0804) (0.0349) (0.0282) (0.0327) (0.011
INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION 1.8761 5.8781 5.8218 1.9117 6.2234
(0.0275) (0.0303) (0.0302) (0.0215) (0.019
INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION2 - 8.3322 - 8.2418 - 8.98
(0.1171) (0.1158) (0.088
INDUSTRY GROWTH - 0.4294 - 0.5269 - 0.4373 - 0.2925 - 0.39
(0.5239) (0.4326) (0.5079) (0.6626) (0.557
GDP GROWTH 8.4484 8.8494 7.9710 8.0883 8.5869
(0.4351) (0.4153) (0.4553) (0.4422) (0.417
P/E - 0.0108 - 0.0136 - 0.0111 - 0.0064 - 0.00
(0.7749) (0.7199) (0.7753) (0.8675) (0.810
TERM SPREAD - 4.2876 - 4.5220 - 3.2656 0.3373 0.2922
(0.8456) (0.8382) (0.8810) (0.9875) (0.989
Number of observations 421 285 285 423 287
McFadden R-square 0.1291 0.1333 0.1253 0.1240 0.1289
Note. The dependent variable in this table equals one if the company grew throughM&A in a
analyses only for the year of M&A. A definition of the explanatory variables and the hypo
explanatory variables are measured in the year before the transaction. The models are estim
industry codes to classify transactions. The p-values are reported in parentheses. Variables
Please cite this article as: Huyghebaert N, Luypaert M, Antecedents of
Belgium, J Bus Res (2009), doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.06.003all targets were from the same industry/country (not reported). The
study ends by investigating whether the same forces matter for public
and private firms (Table 7). DEREGULATION had to be removed from
these split-sample tests, as the number of observations fromderegulated
industries is rather limited.
Tables 5–7 show that internal cash generation, the cash ratio, and
their interactions with (1–ownership concentration) do not influence
external growth decisions in the various subsamples, consistent with
the earlier conclusion that neither agency problems of equity nor
hubris are a predominant force underlying the M&A decisions of
Belgian firms. Yet, Table 5 does reveal that the ratio of EBITDA to assetsIndustry-diversifying takeovers
(6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1.6530 0.9075 0.9210 0.8902 1.0204 1.0356 0.9329





1 - 0.6013 - 0.5764
5) (0.3408) (0.3658)
- 1.1644 - 0.1350
(0.5354) (0.9018)
2.1142 0.4881 0.5363 0.5616 0.4098 0.4630 0.4685
3) (0.1608) (0.6367) (0.6025) (0.5836) (0.6903) (0.6515) (0.6499)
01 - 3.5507 - 1.8895 - 1.9272 - 1.9065 - 1.8192 - 1.8620 - 1.8773
8) (0.0072) (0.0413) (0.0368) (0.0391) (0.0482) (0.0426) (0.0408)
22 - 0.1118 - 0.7987 - 0.8243 - 0.8310 - 0.8664 - 0.8852 - 0.8235
3) (0.8190) (0.0237) (0.0204) (0.0189) (0.0170) (0.0153) (0.0216)
8.8916 10.6371 11.1736 11.1500 10.9164 11.4370 11.2528
6) (0.0923) (0.0014) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0007)
32 - 0.2750 - 0.0743 - 0.0549 - 0.0559 - 0.0794 - 0.0602 - 0.0550
8) (0.0173) (0.3548) (0.5022) (0.4961) (0.3223) (0.4618) (0.5033)
5.9958 0.2542 - 2.3543 - 2.4328 0.2743 - 2.2526 - 2.3016
9) (0.0243) (0.6706) (0.2068) (0.1943) (0.6454) (0.2242) (0.2143)
50 - 8.6999 5.1632 5.2897 5.0082 5.0759
8) (0.0968) (0.1329) (0.1249) (0.1420) (0.1372)
20 - 0.3959 0.2296 0.2174 0.2170 0.1809 0.1717 0.2204
2) (0.5530) (0.6189) (0.6402) (0.6409) (0.6961) (0.7129) (0.6363)
8.5007 3.3746 2.8859 2.7165 3.4916 3.0397 3.0233
2) (0.4213) (0.6536) (0.7016) (0.7188) (0.6416) (0.6857) (0.6871)
94 - 0.0125 - 0.0123 - 0.0119 - 0.0115 - 0.0137 - 0.0133 - 0.0122
6) (0.7477) (0.5814) (0.5936) (0.6074) (0.5412) (0.5530) (0.5858)
- 0.9356 7.2932 6.4942 6.2407 7.3748 6.6559 6.8360
2) (0.9656) (0.6362) (0.6743) (0.6867) (0.6317) (0.6661) (0.6583)
287 786 922 922 788 924 924
0.1268 0.1012 0.1032 0.1033 0.1017 0.1036 0.1029
particular year and zero otherwise. A company and its matching firm are included in the
thesized sign of their relation with the M&A probability are presented in Table 1. All
ated separately for horizontal and industry-diversifying takeovers, using four-digit SIC
that are significant at the 10% level are highlighted in bold.
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Table 6
Logit regression results on domestic versus cross-border M&A decisions.
Domestic takeovers Cross-border takeovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
C 2.6561 2.6199 2.9438 3.0073 - 0.1171 - 0.0834 0.1056 - 0.1254
(0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.8674) (0.9054) (0.8811) (0.8611)
EBITDA/ASSETS 0.0184 1.1229
(0.9849) (0.2571)
EBITDA/ASSETS ⁎ (1–OWN CONC) 0.4808 0.8833
(0.7940) (0.5998)
CASH RATIO - 1.1724 - 0.4728
(0.1277) (0.5000)
CASH RATIO ⁎ (1–OWN CONC) - 2.2243 0.9841
(0.1177) (0.4417)
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 1.5488 1.5622 1.3677 1.0756 0.9545 1.0274 0.9223 1.0177
(0.2088) (0.2017) (0.2600) (0.3818) (0.4113) (0.3810) (0.4291) (0.3846)
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION2 - 3.1108 - 3.0824 - 2.9613 - 2.8902 - 2.2526 - 2.2485 - 2.2442 - 2.2516
(0.0044) (0.0050) (0.0060) (0.0074) (0.0305) (0.0308) (0.0318) (0.0311)
BANK LOANS/ASSETS - 0.5445 - 0.5497 - 0.6779 - 0.6480 - 0.4220 - 0.4114 - 0.4525 - 0.3544
(0.1527) (0.1484) (0.0841) (0.0969) (0.3028) (0.3189) (0.2850) (0.3911)
INTANGIBLES/ASSETS 8.1001 8.0672 8.2860 8.6805 12.0822 12.0312 12.2965 11.5095
(0.0331) (0.0339) (0.0273) (0.0194) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0043)
INDUSTRY MES - 0.3247 - 0.3249 - 0.3432 - 0.3345 0.0174 0.0172 0.0119 0.0236
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.8420) (0.8440) (0.8909) (0.7881)
INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION 1.3188 1.3102 1.4187 1.3394 - 0.0115 - 0.0073 0.0108 - 0.0291
(0.0532) (0.0550) (0.0367) (0.0471) (0.9860) (0.9911) (0.9868) (0.9644)
INDUSTRY GROWTH - 0.4430 - 0.4442 - 0.5172 - 0.5007 0.2153 0.2404 0.2292 0.2407
(0.4064) (0.4045) (0.3304) (0.3458) (0.6826) (0.6469) (0.6632) (0.6456)
GDP GROWTH 4.4880 4.3653 4.2693 4.6150 4.2038 3.7427 4.0583 3.9685
(0.6333) (0.6411) (0.6474) (0.6210) (0.6053) (0.6452) (0.6176) (0.6252)
P/E - 0.0304 - 0.0302 - 0.0311 - 0.0328 0.0030 0.0033 0.0017 0.0041
(0.3507) (0.3555) (0.3447) (0.3197) (0.8990) (0.8888) (0.9436) (0.8596)
TERM SPREAD 2.8454 2.7258 3.0450 4.0536 - 0.2001 - 0.4023 0.2679 - 0.9671
(0.8774) (0.8822) (0.8688) (0.8269) (0.9903) (0.9806) (0.9870) (0.9530)
Number of observations 627 627 630 630 605 605 606 606
McFadden R-square 0.1359 0.1360 0.1390 0.1392 0.0926 0.0914 0.0920 0.0923
Note. The dependent variable in this table equals one if the company grew through M&A in a particular year and zero otherwise. A company and its matching firm are included in the
analyses only for the year of M&A. A definition of the explanatory variables and the hypothesized sign of their relationwith the M&A probability are presented in Table 1. All explanatory
variables aremeasured in theyear before the transaction. Themodels are estimated separately for domestic and cross-border takeovers. Thep-values are reported inparentheses. Variables
that are significant at the 10% level are highlighted in bold.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSis significantly positively related to the likelihood of a horizontal
takeover. Arguably, given that the cash ratio is never significant in this
subsample, the latter finding might reflect that M&A bidders are the
better-performing firms in their industries. In the subsample of related
deals, EBITDA/ASSETS is indeed larger for event firms (not reported).
As for the entire sample, high levels of ownership concentration
reduce the odds of external expansion in the various subsamples.
These results thus do not support the idea that firms with
concentrated ownership favor non-horizontal or cross-border M&As
to diversify owner wealth. Table 7 also reveals that the simple term is
significantly positive for listed firms. In this subsample, the non-linear
relation has a turning point at 30.1%, stressing that ownership
concentration does not rule out takeovers by definition. As an
example, large (informed) owners supporting a firm's external
growth tend to provide a strong signal re the value of a planned
deal, making outsiders willing to finance it. Yet, when these same
owners hold a too large stake in their firm, they may forgo external
growth in order not to relinquish control.
Table 5 reveals that the proportion of bank loans has a significant
negative coefficient in the industry-diversifying M&A equation only.
This result is inconsistent with the financial synergy hypothesis,
conjecturing that highly indebted firms may seek to reduce their
overall risk by diversifying their assets and operations across various
industries. Rather, and consistent with the results in Table 4, it might
reflect that highly leveraged firms do not consider an as broad set of
investment opportunities as firms that are less financially constrained.
Table 6 further shows that leverage restricts especially domestic
takeovers, whichmight reflect that domestic deals are largely initiated
by private bidders. For private firms, having more highly concentrated
ownership on average, internal and external financial constraints arePlease cite this article as: Huyghebaert N, Luypaert M, Antecedents of
Belgium, J Bus Res (2009), doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.06.003likely to bindmore. Finally, Table 7 reports that the proportion of bank
loans plays a comparable restrictive role across private and listedfirms.
The ratio of intangible to total assets has a significant positive effect
in all investigated subsamples. Interestingly but not surprisingly, the
industry variables that were significant in Table 4 matter only in
industry-related and domestic takeovers. In other words, in industries
where incumbents are operating at a lower scale and in more highly
concentrated industries, firms tend to participate especially in
horizontal and domestic M&As. Extending the models with a
quadratic term in industry concentration reveals that this variable is
never significant for domestic M&As (not reported), but bears a
significant negative relation with the probability of horizontal
expansion, as shown in Table 5. This finding thus suggests that further
industry consolidation is more difficult to achieve from a certain level
of sales concentration onwards (35.3% in column 5). This effect likely
reflects that the potential for furtherM&As is smaller in industries that
are already highly concentrated, because of fewer targets being left
over or because of antitrust authorities preventing new deals.
Together, these results support the market power hypothesis. Next,
Table 7 points out that the industry MES is only significant in the
subsample of listed bidders.
Finally, industry growth, GDP growth, and aggregate financial
market conditions play no role in any of the investigated subsamples.
5. Conclusions
This paper empirically investigates the antecedents of mergers and
acquisitions in a typical continental European country during the fifth
M&A wave. The article reports on a study using data on 484 Belgian
bidders that engaged in 990 M&As during 1997–2007, and matchesgrowth through mergers and acquisitions: Empirical results from
Table 7
Logit regression results on the M&A decisions of public versus private firms.
Public firms Private firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
C 1.5632 1.5844 1.7488 1.7821 1.1383 1.1640 1.4661 1.3415
(0.1395) (0.1360) (0.0989) (0.0948) (0.0754) (0.0697) (0.0231) (0.0449)
EBITDA/ASSETS 2.2299 0.5735
(0.1550) (0.4839)
EBITDA/ASSETS ⁎ (1–OWN CONC) 1.1428 0.3570
(0.5489) (0.8332)
CASH RATIO - 0.9222 - 0.9820
(0.4226) (0.1102)
CASH RATIO ⁎ (1–OWN CONC) - 1.2187 - 0.6908
(0.3730) (0.6161)
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION 3.3052 3.4879 3.2080 3.1370 0.2682 0.3126 0.2905 0.1924
(0.0312) (0.0227) (0.0358) (0.0405) (0.8110) (0.7815) (0.7946) (0.8640)
OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION2 - 5.4945 - 5.5126 - 5.3793 - 5.4175 - 2.0772 - 2.0903 - 2.1331 - 2.0921
(0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0339) (0.0326) (0.0289) (0.0321)
BANK LOANS/ASSETS - 1.1339 - 1.0695 - 1.0369 - 1.0475 - 0.5579 - 0.5523 - 0.6940 - 0.5937
(0.0820) (0.1041) (0.1158) (0.1133) (0.0790) (0.0817) (0.0364) (0.0680)
INTANGIBLES/ASSETS 11.5463 11.4458 12.4466 12.4997 14.4106 14.3787 14.3520 14.4208
(0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0098) (0.0096) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
INDUSTRY MES - 0.3962 - 0.3871 - 0.3917 - 0.3928 - 0.0536 - 0.0554 - 0.0719 - 0.0612
(0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.4776) (0.4632) (0.3440) (0.4193)
INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION 1.7214 1.7502 1.8686 1.8528 0.9985 0.9957 1.0631 1.0116
(0.0609) (0.0563) (0.0430) (0.0438) (0.0928) (0.0921) (0.0716) (0.0865)
INDUSTRY GROWTH 0.2672 0.2853 0.2844 0.2857 - 0.1571 - 0.1522 - 0.2270 - 0.1748
(0.6961) (0.6770) (0.6799) (0.6784) (0.7324) (0.7402) (0.6223) (0.7036)
GDP GROWTH 2.1404 2.9716 5.3412 5.3953 7.2800 7.1332 6.6173 6.7439
(0.8600) (0.8050) (0.6570) (0.6538) (0.3110) (0.3220) (0.3576) (0.3483)
P/E 0.0143 0.0105 0.0059 0.0057 - 0.0221 - 0.0214 - 0.0212 - 0.0212
(0.6970) (0.7734) (0.8726) (0.8777) (0.3432) (0.3608) (0.3651) (0.3648)
TERM SPREAD 10.9337 14.7583 19.2466 19.5619 - 2.0832 - 2.2009 - 3.2329 - 2.7051
(0.6572) (0.5442) (0.4302) (0.4237) (0.8876) (0.8814) (0.8261) (0.8543)
Number of observations 285 285 287 287 922 922 924 924
McFadden R-square 0.0881 0.0835 0.0827 0.0831 0.1254 0.1250 0.1282 0.1265
Note. The dependent variable in this table equals one if the company grew throughM&A in a particular year and zero otherwise. A company and its matching firm are included in the
analyses only for the year of M&A. A definition of the explanatory variables and the hypothesized sign of their relation with the M&A probability are presented in Table 1. All
explanatory variables are measured in the year before the transaction. The models are estimated separately for public (i.e. listed) and private (i.e. unlisted) firms. The p-values are
reported in parentheses. Variables that are significant at the 10% level are highlighted in bold.
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ARTICLE IN PRESSthis sample with firms that did not pursue external growth. Thereby,
the research provides a unified analysis of the most widely-cited
motives underlyingM&As. The results point out that the forces driving
deals in Belgium are noticeably different from those underlying
Anglo-Saxon M&As during the 1980s, mainly because of variations in
corporate ownership and governance structures.
First, the data do not support the notion that managerial incentive
problems and/or hubris underlie the takeover decisions of Belgian
firms. Yet, high ownership concentration has a negative effect on the
M&A probability, consistent with the idea that large owners care
about preserving control and thus avoid issuing stock to pay for their
M&As. This inference is further confirmed by the high incidence of
cash acquisitions in the sample and the lack of significance of stock
market prices to explain M&A decisions. Also, M&As tend to occur
more frequently in firms with limited reliance on bank debt. In sum,
whereas Faccio and Masulis (2005) point out that internally- and
externally-imposed financial constraints influence the payment
method in European M&As, this article reveals that these same forces
restrain the choice to initiate M&As in the first place. Hence, the
results in this study may help to explain at least in part why firms in
countries with a civil-law legal origin grow slower and are perceived
to have smaller growth opportunities than firms in countries with a
common-law tradition.
Next, the study provides no support for the financial synergy
hypothesis. Also, the analyses refute the idea that realizing operating
synergies from economies of scale is a key determinant underlying
external growth, as the size of industry incumbents has a negative
effect on the M&A probability. Nonetheless, the transfer of intangibles
is found to be a principal reason behind the M&A decisions of Belgian
firms. Finally, the data point out that securingmarket power is a majorPlease cite this article as: Huyghebaert N, Luypaert M, Antecedents of
Belgium, J Bus Res (2009), doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.06.003consideration in horizontal and domestic takeover decisions, as
industry sales concentration tends to increase the likelihood of such
deals. However, from a certain level of sales concentration onwards,
further consolidation in the same industry is more difficult to achieve.
The findings of the current study have important implications for
future research, particularly in a continental European context, as they
offer hints about the potential sources of M&A value creation.
Consider, however, the following limitations of the study. First, as
the study only investigates bidder, industry, and aggregate financial
market variables, some other potentially important motives under-
lying M&A decisions could not be captured. For example, firms may
initiate deals because of unique target technology or managerial
capabilities. Likewise, firms with net operating losses carried-forward
could be attractive takeover targets. Second, the study examines only
M&A transactions in a single continental European country. Although
Belgium is representative for the family of countries with a French
civil-law legal origin, an avenue for future research is to examine to
what extent the results in this study also arise in other countries.References
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